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o N JUNE 14, 1955, the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Com-
mittee met to consider the sharply divergent views attendant upon
the then prospective air transport agreement between the United States and
the newly constituted German Republic.
As Senator Magnuson, committee chairman, explained in his preliminary
statement of purpose:
The hearing has been called to inquire into the matter of policy in re-
gard to the issuance of the foreign air carrier permit to a new German air-
line and the negotiation of a bilateral air transport service agreement.
It has come to the committee's attention that the State Department
and the Civil Aeronautics Board have been negotiating with represen-
tatives of the German Republic during the past week with respect to
terms and conditions of the proposed air transport agreement and that
on last Thursday or Friday an agreement was reached which we were
informed may not be in the best interests of American aviation or the
United States; specifically, this committee wishes to consider whether
the proposed agreement and the manner in which it has been negotiated
was carrying out the policies of Congress as set forth in the Civil Aero-
nautics Act, which act is intended to further the promotion and develop-
ment of American air transportation systems both at home and abroad.
The committee held public hearings and sat in executive session, at the
request of the parties representing opposite views as to the equities of the
agreement. Witnesses from both Government and private air carriers were
heard. Thereafter, because of the unexpected execution of the agreement
and the controversy that had developed, the chairman appointed a special
subcommittee, consisting of Senators Smathers (chairman), Bible, and
Bricker to "inquire into all facts and circumstances surrounding the nego-
tiation and entering into of international air route agreements with par-
ticular reference to the recently signed agreement between the United
States and the West German Republic involving the operations in this
country of the Lufthansa Airlines." Further public hearings were held.
This series of hearings extended over a 6-week period. Witnesses were
heard from the Department of State, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the
United States-flag airlines operating across the North Atlantic, the United
States-flag airlines operating across the North Atlantic, and the United
States-flag airlines operating to South America, the airlines operating
within the United States, and the industry's trade group, the Air Transport
Association of America. We directed that our staff study and analyze the
hearings. Based upon such analyses, the committee submits this first interim
report.
Although the committee intended initially, as indicated by the chairman's
preparatory remarks, to confine its inquiry to the instant German agree-
ment, the subcommittee could not so restrict itself and still do justice to
the basic issue around which revolves the question of the place of the United
States in world air transportation. Indeed, it would be fruitless to consider
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or evaluate this agreement in an intellectual vacuum. The hearings pro-
duced evidence, and data were submitted transcending the problem raised
by the United States-German negotiations. The committee found the cir-
cumstances surrounding the immediate problem symptomatic, at the least,
and the ills allegedly resultant from the agreement as worthy of legislative
diagnosis. For, indeed, the Board, as a legislative creation, has a responsi-
bility under the Act to both Congress and the public as well as the airlines
it regulates.
It was deemed necessary to review the background against which these
air-transport agreements, executive at least in definition, are negotiated
and to examine-possibly even reexamine-the roles, the responsibilities,
and the purposes of the agencies of our Government entrusted, on the one
hand, with the conduct of our international affairs and, on the other, with
the economic well-being of United States international and domestic air
transport. This appeared particularly significant in view of the difference
in view of respective responsibilities enunciated by the Civil Aeronautics
Board and the State Department as to the primary functions and responsi-
bilities of each of them.
But, before dissecting the rationale of our Government's aims in con-
cluding these bilateral understandings, we should, at the outset, note the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreement which triggered
these investigations.
II. THE CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDANT UPON THE CONSUMMATION OF THE
UNITED STATES-GERMAN AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT
We were told by the Department of State that "in 1951 it became
apparent that the occupation restriction on German civil aviation would
be removed and that Germany ultimately would regain her prewar position
as a major participant in international civil aviation." In the light of this,
the Department felt it was necessary to persuade the prospective German
Republic that our philosophy of international air transport was sound.
"These principles," advised the State Department, included "the basic
American philosophy of regulated competition in the public interest." And
this doctrine, developed at Bermuda in 1946, was inimical to our considera-
tion of un-American concepts such as cartelism, division of markets, appor-
tionment of traffic, and any similar arbitrary restrictionism.
After the Bonn Conventions were signed in 1952, the Civil Aeronautics
Board and the Department of State agreed that it was desirable to conclude
a bilateral air transport agreement with Germany at an early date-
in order to (a) obtain Germany's adherence to liberal Bermuda principles(to be discussed later) before German aviation officials were exposed to
the restrictionist views of certain other governments, and (b) protect
existing traffic rights of United States operators through Germany.
It is important to realize that the basic agreement contains the con-
trolling principles to be adhered to, and the purpose of the route annex is
to translate such principles into equitable route exchanges. No one differed
on the high-mindedness of this purpose. But an agreement itself is an
empty one if the principles are later bargained away in an inequitable
exchange of routes.
The informal discussions, on principle only, as we understand it, were
held in Bonn during November and December of 1954. The formal negotia-
tions were deferred, pending a pertinent CAB route award, until 1955.
Finally, in April, the CAB decided its London/Frankfurt-Rome Service
case and the negotiations were scheduled to be held in Washington in June,
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coincident with the inaugurating of service to New York, on an interim
authority, by the German airline, Lufthansa.
The negotiations for exchanging routes and reaching final agreement
on the other terms was planned for a few days only. These discussions
began in Washington on Monday, June 6, 1955. The execution of the agree-
ment, with accompanying route annex, was scheduled for Friday of the
same week, June 10.
The initial German request for routes was received in May of 1955. it
appears that the Board notified the carriers of the Germans' route requests
first by letter dated May 17. This request was amended later-at the first
meeting with the Germans on June 6. But, when the route agreement was
ultimately signed (parenthetically, while this committee was still consider-
ing equities of the exchange), it included a route which had not been
previously suggested by the German negotiators in their two written
requests.
From the testimony, it is clear that the original request of the Germans
did not specify a route to any point in South America; that the only
mention in the previously submitted lists of routes, in this latter regard,
was a request for a route to Bogota, Colombia, made on June 6. When the
agreement was finally signed, however, there was substituted, at the insist-
ence of our Government's negotiators, a wide-open authorization for the
German airline to operate from New York to any and all points in the
Caribbean and, indeed, beyond, to any and all points in South America.
It appears from the evidence that United States-flag carriers had no
opportunity to comment on these awards. The carriers were notified of the
original route request by a letter from the Board dated May 17, inviting
them to a meeting which was held on May 24. Then, the carriers commented
on the routes listed by the Germans but did not focus on a route to South
America because none had been requested. Indeed, carriers interested only
in routes from the United States to the Caribbean and South America were
not even asked by the Air Transport Association to be present at this meet-
ing with the Board and the Department of State. There was no reason for
their presence. No routes to those areas were being considered.
When the Germans submitted their request for a route to Colombia, the
carriers were informed by their industry representatives "observing" the
negotiations. The carriers never learned of the offer of the final route to
South America until it was offered to and promptly accepted by the Germans
on Thursday, June 9, prior to the scheduled signing on Friday, June 10.
The carriers requested an opportunity to meet with the Board to comment
on the revised route on Thursday morning and again on Friday morning.
Both requests were denied. On this, there is agreement by all parties.
So at this point our domestic airlines were faced with the granting of
routes by our Government that the Germans had not asked for, and with
the refusal of the United States negotiating team to even discuss the new
routes with them. Certainly if this kind of thing occurred in a courtroom
the airlines would have had every right to claim surprise and protect them-
selves by severe cross-examination. But they were refused even the courtesy
of an interview. Indeed, the position they found themselves in might better
be described by the legal term of entrapment.
Pursuant to a rather pointed suggestion we made at our hearings during
the week beginning June 13, the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Depart-
ment of State did hear the comments of the carriers on June 22. On that
same date, the chairman of the committee, in a letter to the Chairman of
the Civil Aeronautics Board, expressed his pleasure with this prospective
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meeting and among other things stated, "As previously requested, the
committee would appreciate a further report after the views of the air
carriers have been considered."
The Civil Aeronautics Board and the Department of State, however,
hampered further real consideration of this problem by this committee or
anyone else by signing the agreement with the Germans on July 7 and
informing this committee on that same date, through a letter from the
Chairman of the Board, that the Board and the Department of State had-
reached the joint decision that it is in the long-run interest of United
States aviation, both with respect to Germany and other foreign coun-
tries, that the agreement should be signed without further delay.
The Department and the Board indicated that each of them had given
full consideration to the views of the American airlines who had objected
to the signing of the agreement and that they had fully complied, in their
view, with the committee's request to reexamine the proposed air agreement
and found no new aspects that had not been before considered. This per-
emptory action of the Department of State and the Board obviously altered
the character and program of the committee's contribution and activity with
respect to the German agreement. The Government's attitude leads to the
query: Was not the day in court granted our own flag carriers empty jus-
tice? And the answer to this is clearly indicated in the affirmative by the
comments made by United States carriers to the subcommittee since this
occurrence; by the obvious inadequacy of the Government's preparation of
economic data for the route negotiations; by the inaccuracy of the efforts
of the Board's staff to accumulate statistical materials-made available to
our own airlines only at the close of the Board's executive session with them.
At that time, the chairman of this committee said that the statement
that full consideration had been given the views of operators of the Ameri-
can airlines was contrary to the testimony of their representatives. The
affected airlines had complained that the United States paid too high a price
for the traffic rights obtained in return from Germany. They insisted that
our Government had not properly valued the United States market and the
rights Germany derived from serving that market. The airlines contended
also that our Government had misinterpreted the Bermuda principles and
had failed to give the airlines an adequate opportunity to present their
views on the routes given to the Germans. Each of these complaints appeared
so serious that the chairman appointed a subcommittee to conduct further
hearings. Each of the charges by the carriers was reviewed. Before com-
menting on those specifically, however, there are two general observations
we would like to make.
The committee after this extensive hearing and investigation is not
recommending that the agreement with Germany be denounced at this time.
This is not because from economic and politcal considerations it should not
be, but because once the United States has entered an international agree-
ment it should make every effort to abide by its letter and spirit. However,
our Government should insist fully upon performance of the basic principles
of the agreement and make full use of the agreed rights to consultation for
either interpretation or amendment to the agreement under article 12 or
even termination under article 16 if abuses should develop. Furthermore,
the committee is of the view that our Government should take lessons from
this agreement and the steps which led to it as a guide in the negotiation of
future bilateral air transport agreements and in the enforcement and
amendment of existing agreements.
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The committee wishes to make one other general observation with respect
to the air transport negotiations conducted by this Government. We wish
it to be perfectly clear that nothing said in this report in any way implies
that the United States should engage in unfair pressure tactics in inter-
national negotiations. Our representatives should give full recognition to
the legitimate rights and the aspirations of foreign countries to develop
their own trade and commerce. Any agreement should be negotiated for its
long-range benefits as well as its immediate objectives. To achieve those,
the provisions of the agreement must be fair to both sides. While an agree-
ment must be fair to foreign states, it should also, however, be fair to the
interests of this country.
An agreement can no more be a happy one for the long term if our
interests are prejudiced than it can if foreign interests are dealt with
unfairly. In order to obtain fair treatment for American interests, it is
the responsibility of our Government representatives to clearly recognize
those interests and rights and bring them to the attention of the other
negotiating party. No foreign state can be expected to give American inter-
ests any greater recognition or any better protection than our Government
requests. Only by a full and frank discussion of the economic values and
benefits that are being traded can the United States expect to make the
foreign country aware of those rights or give to us the recognition required.
The comments on these negotiations are directed more to establishing pro-
cedure that will assure that our Government agencies appreciate the vital
importance of the rights being negotiated and trade carefully to permit
foreign states to achieve their objectives without impairing or damaging
the vital air transport rights of our country.
What, then, are the principles which should govern the conduct of our
international air relations throughout the free world? They must be
assessed if we are to appreciate the problems raised by this particular
agreement.
III. THE PRINCIPLES AFFECTING THE NEGOTIATION AND APPLICATION OF
BILATERAL AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENTS
A. The nature of international air transport rights
The legal basis for operating international airlines is totally different
from that in the maritime field. It is universally recognized that each
sovereign nation controls its airspace and can admit, or refuse to admit,
aircraft of other nations as it sees fit. On the other hand, the doctrine of
"freedom of the seas" was expanded, years ago, to include freedom of the
ports. By and large, steamships can do business in the harbors throughout
the world without commercial limitation or regulation by the local govern-
ments. Commercial aircraft cannot do this.
There appears to be general agreement, in government, and in the United
States air carrier industry, that the existing legal basis for the conduct of
international air transport service is in the best interests of the United
States and should be continued. It has been the accepted basis for United
States civil aviation policy since World War II, and there appears to be no
responsible opinion proposing to change it.
B. Efforts to develop multilateral agreement
To prepare for the development which was foreseen after World War II,
a major effort was launched by the nations interested in aviation to open
the skies by international agreement. The United States called an Aviation
Conference to be held in Chicago in November of 1944. Over 50 nations
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attended that Conference. More than 5 weeks were spent in attempting to
deal with the problems that were then posed. The Conference met with
success in dealing with two of them.
The first was the exchange of rights to fly through the national airspace,
to land for fuel and other technical and nontraffic purposes. This was done
by multilateral agreement called the International Air Services Transit
Agreement which was signed by more than 40 countries and is in effect
between every major country with vast land areas to pass over except
Russia, China, and Brazil.
The second achievement of the Chicago Conference was the adoption of
the International Civil Aviation Convention creating ICAO, which has been
outstandingly successful in dealing with technical problems of international
air transportation.
On the exchange of commercial rights the Convention failed to reach
effective agreement. In order to operate commercially between sovereign
states the airlines need not only the right to fly into and land for fuel, but
they need also the right to discharge passengers and cargo and take on
other traffic for the return or onward flight. The exchange of such com-
mercial rights was left for other agreements, which have continued to be
negotiated on a bilateral basis.
C. The Bermuda Agreement
The bilateral which paved the way for the development of international
air transport operations after the war was entered into with the United
Kingdom at Bermuda in 1946. Practically all the bilaterals entered into by
the United States since that date follow the pattern adopted there. This
pattern established a number of important steps in the negotiation of an
agreement.
First, routes have to be exchanged. In drawing up this exchange, the
carriage of the traffic, not only between the United States and foreign coun-
try, but also between that foreign country and third countries by the foreign
country, must be negotiated. This latter third-country traffic is sometimes
called "Fifth Freedom Traffic," the fill-up traffic essential to economical
operation of aircraft.
Second, general standards for governing the amount of capacity to be
operated must be agreed upon.
Third, a procedure must be established to deal with the problem of rates
to be charged for the service.
A number of additional subjects must be dealt with-important, but not
now germane to the issues before the subcommittee.
The capacity issue deserves special discussion. Because of its importance
and the controversy which surrounded it during the hearings, it is believed
necessary to understand the origin and the meaning of the Bermuda capacity
provisions which have been placed in most of the existing bilaterals of the
United States.
Basically, these provisions lay down the principles governing the amount
of service which may be operated over the routes exchanged. They were
drawn after the war as a compromise between the conflicting economic
philosophies of air transport regulation.
One of the conflicting philosophies was represented by the United States.
We contended that numerous countries should exchange commercial rights
by a multilateral agreement pursuant to which operators could fly freely
into the countries of their choice, with as many flights as they chose, and
pick up traffic in each country which was going to any other country. As
Mr. Stuart G. Tipton, president of the Air Transport Association of America
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testified, "This was an extremely liberal position for that time--one that
caused concern even in the United States."
The contrary philosophy, advocated by the United Kingdom, as well ,as
others, was that the number of flights was to be controlled. This referred
not only to the flights between the country of origin and the foreign country
but particularly to the number of flights going from one foreign country to
a second foreign country. A prevailing concern among foreign states was
that the United States would flood the market with air service. The United
States in the last years of the war was manufacturing the only aircraft
readily adaptable for commercial transport. Some countries were appre-
hensive that these aircraft, in the hands of United States operators, would
start such a volume of service, not only between the United States and
foreign countries, but between foreign cities such as London and Paris, as
to retard the normal development of foreign airlines. These fears prompted
the advocacy, in Europe, of several devices for limiting flights and capacity.
One method was to limit the number of flights by agreements, as was a
standard practice in the European area before World War II. Even in the
agreements the United States had entered into with the United Kingdom
and France, the schedules had been limited to 2 and 4 a week respectively.
Another device for controlling the number of flights, advocated by some
countries at the Chicago Conference, was to establish an international
agency to assign frequencies.
A third device advocated was to adopt a mathematical formula to govern
increase in frequencies. Thus, no carrier would be allowed to increase its
carrying capacity until it was operating at 60 percent, or some other fixed
percentage, of the capacity then being operated.
To reach agreement between such divergent views, compromise was nec-
essary. This compromise was not reached at the Chicago Conference, but
at the Bermuda Conference the United States recognized the fears of the
British with respect to possible shuttle services that would jeopardize local
operators. On its part the United Kingdom yielded on its insistence to limit
frequencies by mathematical formulas. There was, therefore, developed and
accepted by the United States and the United Kingdom the concept that
the "services provided * * * shall retain as their primary objective the
provision of capacity adequate to the traffic demands between the country
of which such airline is a national and the countries of ultimate destination
of the traffic."
Thus, the backbone, so to speak, of United States air carrier traffic had
to be traffic between the United States and countries of ultimate destination
of the traffic. Similarly, the backbone of the United Kingdom traffic had to
be traffic between the United Kingdom and countries of ultimate destination
of the traffic. This was an effective brake upon the operation of services
primarily for the carriage of third-country traffic. For the United States,
for example, this would mean London-Paris or London-Mexico City traffic.
Again as an example, for the United Kingdom this would mean New York-
Mexico City or Paris-New York traffic.
After this test of primary objective was met there then existed the
right to pick up third-country traffic subject to three general rules of a
qualitative nature. These rules and the concepts which we have just dis-
cussed were put together in a capacity article which reads as follows:
The air services made available to the public by the airlines
operating under this Agreement shall bear a close relationship to
the requirements of the public for such services.
It is the understanding of both contracting parties that services
provided by a designated airline under the present agreement shall
retain as their primary objective the provision of capacity adequate
to the traffic demands between the country of which such airline is
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a national and the countries of ultimate destination of the traffic.
The right to embark or disembark on such services international
traffic destined for and coming from third countries at a point or
points on the routes specified in this Agreement shall be applied in
accordance with the general principles of orderly development to
which both contracting parties subscribe and shall be subject to the
general principle that capacity should be related-
(a) to traffic requirements between the country of origin and
the countries of ultimate destination of the traffic;
(b) to the requirements of through airline operation; and
(c) to the traffic requirements of the area through which the
airline passes after taking account of local and regional services.
While this provision does not have the precision of a mathematical
formula, it is generally recognized as a sound statement of principles to
guide the day-to-day determination of capacity offered in international air
transportation.
This quality of the provision was recognized by both government spokes-
men and airline witnesses. Thus, Assistant Secretary Waugh said:
* * * when in February 1946, the negotiators of the United States
and the United Kingdom met in Bermuda to attempt to conclude an
air transport agreement it was apparent that the agreement to be
concluded would have to contain compromises which both countries
could accept and apply in their air transport operations * * * The
British had, in the first instance, desired to regulate the volume of
service in order to protect the services of United Kingdom airlines
from overwhelming competition by the already strong United States
airlines. The United States on the other hand desired to establish
freedom of operation in order that the natural development of po-
tential air traffic and the natural effects of competition might provide
the public with the best possible air service and at the same time
provide for the healthy expansion and development of the airlines
providing this service. The result was a compromise reached with
regard to the capacity provisions. * * * The long trunk services of
the United States could not economically survive if they were to
carry only traffic originating in the United States or destined
thereto. * * * it was recognized that the trunk services should not
force the local or regional services out of business.
Similarly, Mr. Stuart G. Tipton, then general counsel and now presi-
dent of the Air Transport Association of America, who is intimately familiar
with the history of the air transport negotiations, testified:
When the Conference between the United Kingdom and the
United States began in 1946, the two Governments were about as far
apart as they could get on this particularly difficult subject. * * *
A compromise was finally arrived at. The United Kingdom was re-
quired to forego the rigid mathematical formulas it had previously
adhered to. Instead, capacity was to be governed by stated general
principles which recognized the interests of both contending parties.
All of the services provided under the agreement were to "bear a
close relationship to the requirements of the public for such service."
* * * Carriage of third-country traffic was further sanctioned by
the adoption of the principles that in judging capacity the needs of
the through airline operator were to be recognized.
Thus, the draftsmen of this provision sought to prohibit the ex-
tremes of airline conduct which both parties agreed to regard as
objectionable. * * *
D. Participation by United States-flag carriers in international
negotiations
The complexity of route considerations, among others, involved in the
negotiation of a bilateral air transport agreement underscore the impor-
ance, it seems to us, of continuing United States carrier participation at
every stage of United States negotiations with foreign governments. Gen-
erally speaking, a foreign government is speaking for only one nationally
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owned carrier. Our Government represents competitive considerations. Other
governments keep their carriers advised from the outset, even to the extent
of intelligence as to the routes to be offered. No less should be expected of
United States negotiators. United States-flag carriers and/or their industry
representatives must be provided the opportunity to be heard, before nego-
tiations begin and at their every stage, before their rights are bargained
away.
From the airlines' point of view a duplication of routes by a foreign
airline can be as serious to commercial interests as duplication by a domes-
tic airline. In the latter case, the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 gives them
extensive and adequate opportunities to object. Thus, before an American-
flag carrier is authorized to operate a route previously awarded to another
American-flag operator, an application must be filed under section 401 of
the Civil Aeronautics Act. Hearings are held; tentative reports must be
filed; and oral argument is permitted before the Board. All of these pre-
cautions are taken to protect the interests of an existing American operator
when his route may be duplicated by another American operator.
When a foreign airline is given, in effect, permission to duplicate the
existing route of an American airline, similar rights are invaded but the
opportunity to object and to oppose is more limited. In fact, in the German
case it was denied. The need for safeguards is therefore imperative and
since other negotiations are now in progress, the need is pressing.
A problem considered by this committee was how best to provide the
carriers with an opportunity to protect their interests in these international
route awards.
The carriers testified that section 402 of the Civil Aeronautics Act,
although intended to provide this opportunity, is not adequate.
Mr. Tipton testified:
Section 402 of the Civil Aeronautics Act may have been intended
as one method of protecting those interests but it has proved im-
practical for that purpose. Section 402 provides that a foreign air
carrier must receive a permit from our government before it may
start its operations to the United States. A public hearing is pro-
vided for in that section. United States carriers can, and sometimes
do, appear at those hearings to protest the granting of a permit to
a foreign carrier, but that is really not effective because, in order
to comply with the carrier's request, the Board would have to deviate
from the terms of a bilateral agreement. Nor is it possible for a
carrier to protect its interests after the negotiations are concluded
and the agreement is made public. No matter how strong its case, it
has an uphill battle to reverse or revise an agreement already en-
tered into.
In addition, under the 1948 Supreme Court decision, in the Waterman
Case (333 U. S. 103), since section 801 of the Civil Aeronautics Act places
the final approval of all such actions in the President, the CAB's force is
exhausted when it serves to make "a recommendation to the President."
"* * * Presidential control is not limited to a negative but it is a positive
and detailed control over the Board's decisions, unparalleled in the history
of American administrative bodies."
Not only is the Board's function in these matters advisory, but since
this advisory function relates to foreign affairs, the President has another
legally constituted advisor, the Department of State. And since this De-
partment conducts the bilateral negotiations, it presumably will recom-
mend that the President make the route award consistent with the bilateral
agreement. It is clear, therefore, that, practically speaking, the time at
which considerations of the interests of American-flag carriers must receive
effective consideration is before and during the negotiation of the appro-
priate bilateral agreement.
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The issue presented, therefore, is whether at the preparation and nego-
tiation stage an additional procedure should be instituted. Both the carriers
and the CAB have referred to a practice now being followed in most cases
which seeks to solve the problem although not specifically provided in the
statute. The procedure referred to is that of consulting with the carriers
and their representatives before and during the negotiations. Thus, the
Board said:
The United States carriers would normally be apprised of such pro-
posals (route request for foreign airlines) and subsequent changes
therein, whether by government representatives or by their own
representatives acting as observer at the conferences.
While the carriers recognize that this procedure had been adopted in
dealing with past negotiations, their industry representative went on to say:
Our trouble has been that the procedure for consultation with the
carriers has not been sufficiently well established to insure that com-
plete and extensive consultation with respect to all cases. It is our
hope that this committee can be of assistance in establishing a pro-
cedure which will always be followed.
The committee, after giving careful consideration to the existing pro-
cedure, endorses the need for effective consultations with the carrier at all
stages of these negotiations and recommends strongly that they be employed
as an established procedure to provide protection for carrier interests. We
would hope that more than lip service consultation can be provided without
writing it in the statute. Whether definitive legislation prescribing this, as
well as other possible procedures, may be necessary will require further
-and perhaps continuing study.
Certainly, if future negotiations are conducted as was the German
agreement, then this committee would almost of necessity be forced to the
conclusion that the representatives of the United States involved in these
matters had not been attentive to our hearings, to say the least.
The additional reasons why our Government should consult with the
carriers before concluding air transport agreements and the spirit in which
the negotiations should be conducted were well stated by one of the witnesses
to appear before us:
The job which our Government faces in its situation is an impor-
tant one from the standpoint of the total national interest, not just
that of the carriers. That job should be done in the best possible way.
Every available tool should be used to make certain that the nego-
tiation is successful. One of the most useful tools to be used in
achieving this result is the combined knowledge and experience of
the air transport industry. That knowledge and experience is avail-
able to the Government, and use should be made of it. The general
attitude which should lie behind the Government's interest in con-
sulting with the carriers is not that of giving the carriers a hearing,
but it should be based upon a desire to make certain at every step
of the way that no mistakes are being made. It is particularly im-
portant that our Government take advantage of the availability of
this expert assistance in view of the fact that the foreign delega-
tions with whom they will be dealing are usually the direct owners
of the carriers of that foreign nation.
IV. THE BERMUDA PRINCIPLES: THE CHALLENGE THEY PROVIDE TO IMPROVE
THE POSITION OF UNITED STATES-FLAG CARRIERS IN THE
WORLD AIR MARKET
The airlines contend that the grant of routes to foreign countries gen-
erally and in the German negotiations in particular were and are excessive
and unnecessary because our negotiators had not adequately analyzed and
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presented the great values enjoyed by foreign carriers when they operate
to the United States. Because the American market has been undervalued,
our Government has been led to grant more concessions than were necessary.
The opportunities for improving the United States-flag position, in some
respects by recognizing the value of our own market, falls into two cate-
gories.
The first category deals with the granting of routes as between the
United States and a foreign government. This may appear either as part
of the initial negotiation or as separate negotiations in later years for
amendment of the routes originally granted.
The second category has to do with the interpretation and application
of the agreements-that is, the use of the agreements to achieve proper
regulation within the agreed "rules of the game."
A. The negotiation for routes
It is evident that these two categories are related to each other. For
example, a nation can be very restrictive in its grant of routes, but then
be generous in its interpretation of the capacity provisions. Thus, the
United Kingdom has tended to be liberal in its view of capacity require-
ments, but even it has been very careful in the grant of routes. With the
exception of an infrequent service by Air India, the only airlines offering
service between London and Paris are those of British and French nation-
alities. No American airline can do this. Likewise, except for British and
American carriers, the only carrier serving London en route between Europe
and the United States is El-Al Israel, which operates on a limited frequency.
Conversely, a nation could be somewhat generous in the grant of routes
but rigorous in the application of capacity limitations.
It appears from the testimony that the United States has been too gen-
erous on both counts. We have fallen between the two schools and have
come perilously close to departing from the principle of regulated competi-
tion on which our civil aviation policy has theoretically been founded. At
the same time, our airlines have been forced to bow to the stringent views
of other governments.
The prospective impact of foreign-flag airlines operations requires that
the United States implement more forcefully a policy of control under the
terms of the agreements.
This statement refers to the net balance in the aviation interests of the
United States. Other countries have given effect to capacity provisions and,
consequently, brought about a reduction of United States services. On the
other hand, the committee has not been cited a single case where the United
States has used the agreed capacity regulations in a bilateral to control or
regulate the nature of the competition offered by a foreign airline.
The arguments for a liberal policy on the part of the United States over
the past decade are familiar and have had much merit. First, the United
States has properly sought to encourage the development of strong and
efficient airlines in other friendly countries as part of its program for
economic reconstruction after World War II. Second, the United States has
necessarily entered into reciprocal route exchanges in order to establish
worldwide air transport services under the United States flag commensurate
with our responsibilities in the commercial, political, and security spheres.
These objectives have been attained and a number of strong airlines have
been established in friendly foreign countries-some of them with consider-
able financial assistance from our Government.
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Of the 10 largest international airlines in the world today (based on
1954 IATA revenue ton-kilometers), only 2 are United States-flag, while 2
are British, 5 are other European, and 1 is Australian. Of these 8 foreign-
flag competitors, 5 are wholly owned and the balance are partially owned by
their governments. The two British Government companies are responsible
for practically all of the regularly scheduled international services of the
United Kingdom. The French Government company is responsible for
almost all of the French international service. The Dutch, Scandinavian,
Belgian, and Australian companies conduct all of the international services
of those countries, respectively. The Canadian Government company con-
ducts the majority of Canada's international service.
The United States should continue to foster and maintain a strong
competitive United States-flag civil air transport position, and at moderate
subsidy. The ability of the airlines to minimize their subsidy requirements
will be aided immeasurably by a United States policy of exercising consid-
erable caution during negotiations of routes and route amendments with
other governments, and by the United States insisting the other parties
adhere to the terms of the air transport agreement.
B. The need for more effective control of capacity
It is essential that the United States have a guiding principle to be
followed in the negotiation of air route agreements with other governments.
That principle is to be found, as above indicated, in the agreement between
the United States and the United Kingdom entered into at Bermuda in
February 1946. As previously noted, this agreement is the prototype for
the many others since negotiated by our Government.
Briefly, the guiding principle as we see it is that routes should be granted
and capacity regulated in relation to the flow of traffic between countries
party to an agreement and the other countries on a given route, recog-
nizing that primary sources of traffic are not always the same. There are
two types of primary traffic to be considered. One is the traffic moving
between the country of the airline's nationality and third countries inter-
mediate to or beyond the other country.
The opportunity to carry traffic between the other country and third
countries is a secondary and restricted privilege. It is granted in order to
serve the public convenience and to augment the economic support for long
routes. It is restricted in order to prevent origin and destination traffic
from being captured by the airlines of other nations which have no proper
claim to it, within the legal basis universally accepted.
As an illustration, with respect to traffic between New York and Paris,
the airlines of the United States and France logically should have a pre-
dominant claim. Likewise, as to traffic between New York and Switzerland,
for example, the airlines of the United States and Switzerland have the
primary claim. With respect to traffic between France and Switzerland, the
airlines of those two countries occupy the primary position.
Under the principles now in force, the United States-flag line is given
a secondary right to carry traffic between France and Switzerland. This is
sound, but only as long as the carriage of traffic by the United States-flag
line between France and Switzerland is subordinate to the primary purpose
of serving traffic which has its origin or destination in the United States.
This pattern exists throughout the world under the agreements to which
the United States is a party. It is supposed to apply not just to the United
States-flag lines but to the foreign-flag competitors. The practical question
is whether it has been applied in fact.
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C. The United States has not controlled capacity effectively
From all of its inquiries into the subject, it is the opinion of the com-
mittee that this principle has not adequately been followed when the United
States has granted routes to foreign countries. The United States is en-
countering competition which does not conform to the basic principles. In
notable cases, routes have been granted where the available traffic statistics
show all too clearly that the primary purpose of the route sector would be
carriage of third-country "fifth freedom" traffic, contrary to the principles
contained in the underlying agreement.
As to capacity regulation, we have already noted inability to cite to us
a single case where the United States has asked a foreign government to
alter the nature of its airline's operation in order to put origin and destina-
tion traffic in the primary category. To put this another way, there is
considerable evidence that certain important foreign-flag competitors are
carrying traffic to, from, and beyond the United States, to which, under the
principles agreed to in the relevant air transport agreements, they are not
entitled. It does not appear, moreover that our Government has ever sought
to accumulate the statistics necessary to support this contention in consul-
tation with the other government concerned. We believe that such statistics
can and should be required, that they will demonstrate the condition which
we have described, and that they would furnish a basis for fair and equitable
regulation.
D. The German agreement is a striking example of questionable negotiation
for routes and prospective difficulties of capacity control
In this agreement, Germany was given rights "beyond New York" in
addition to starting with rights "beyond Germany." The airlines generally
contended that Germany, like other European countries, received advantages
in its "beyond Germany" to the United States rights which exceeded the
advantages of the "beyond" rights of United States carriers, and then in
addition secured valuable rights beyond the United States. They argued
that this created a highly inequitable unbalance in favor of Germany.
The Civil Aeronautics Board and the Department of State responded
to these airline contentions with two lines of argument. First, they argued
that the airlines overvalued the third-country or fifth-freedom rights granted
to Germany and they submitted their own estimate of the value of the routes
exchanged with the Germans. The following table submitted to the commit-
tee by the Civil Aeronautics Board, after the negotiation and never prior
to that to the United States carriers, indicates the values which the Govern-
ment assigned to the United States and to Germany from the exchanges
made in the agreement:
Summary of State-CAB estimated values to the United States and Germany of
the exchange of third-country fifth-freedom rights
United States:
Germany-points intermediate between the United States and
Germany $ 239,000
Germany-points beyond Germany:




United States-points intermediate between United States and
Germany 1,186,000
United States-points beyond United States, excluding New York
-Habana 246,000
New York-Habana $ 176,000 377,000
Total 1,068,000 1,809,000
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The facts as presented by the Government itself clearly support the
position of the carriers. The Government data shows the value of third-
country or fifth-freedom rights to United States carriers to be $1,021,000.
Third-country or fifth-freedom rights for Germany between the United
States and points intermediate between the United States and Germany was
by itself valued at $1,186,000, or over 14 percent above the $1,021,000
third-country or fifth-freedom traffic secured and estimated to be secured
by the United States. When the value of third-country or fifth-freedom
traffic for Germany for certain points beyond the United States is included,
the advantage to Germany-this is according to the Government's own
figures, submitted to this committee, and shown on the chart-is increased
to within a range of 56 to 77 percent above that of the United States.
This already tabulated overwhelming disparity in favor of Germany is
only part of the story. The Civil Aeronautics Board estimates reflect no
value for the traffic going to points in South America other than those on
the west coast, although the Germans were granted rights to serve the
whole of South America. Similarly, Habana is the only point in the Carib-
bean reckoned with between New York and the Caribbean, although rights
were granted from beyond New York to any point in the Caribbean.
Even more important, however, the Civil Aeronautics Board chart
assigns no value to the traffic which Lufthansa would be entitled under the
agreement to carry between the United States and points beyond Germany.
The value of such traffic carried by United States airlines alone was some-
thing on the order of $20 million in 1954. Additionally, a large amount of
traffic between the United States and points beyond Germany was carried
by foreign airlines. Obviously, the Germans will secure an amount of such
traffic which will have a very high value, perhaps several million dollars per
year. As this report will show, in the next section, other European carriers
secure from this and other third-country traffic amounts ranging from
2.5 to 9 million dollars a year.
All in all, the figures submitted by the Government itself clearly indi-
cate to us that the Germans got much the better of the bargain. They were
given, in addition to the appropriate and reciprocal equal opportunity to
compete for the economically rich United States-Germany market, a right
to operate in the market between the United States and countries interme-
diate to and beyond Germany, and to operate in the market between the
United States and the Caribbean and South America. The value of the
third-country rights could not at any point be reciprocated by Germany.
It was their second and cumulative bonanza which tipped the scales so over-
whelmingly in their favor.
The failure of the Government to measure the full value of the routes
granted to Germany, and the refusal to use this value to bargain in defense
of the United States interests is, it seems to us, one of the highly unfor-
givable aspects of the negotiations with Germany. Putting aside the possi-
bility of corrective action, it can certainly be said that this type of approach
in the bargaining process is one which simply cannot and must not be
repeated.
Moreover, it does not justify the failure to prepare and use adequate
data to say, after the negotiations are over, that the carriers' estimates in
dollars "exaggerate greatly the value ascribed to fifth-freedom markets
granted to Germany." Even if the carriers' data were exaggerated this
does not absolve the Civil Aeronautics Board from developing and consid-
ering what it might claim to be "unexaggerated" valuations of the grants
to Germany. As a matter of fact, it appeared to us that the industry sup-
plied more complete and accurate statistical data than did the Government.
The Board, however, apparently placed no value on the German ability
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to carry traffic between the United States and points beyond Germany. To
the committee, this is a serious shortcoming, particularly in light of the
fact that the great value of such rights was demonstrated by the carriers
during the hearings. Furthermore, this committee itself, in its letter of
June 22, expressed its view that these rights were of great value and must
be considered.
This omission on the part of the Board constituted not only a disregard
of the views of this committee, but also a failure to give attention to an
economic fact well recognized throughout the world. For example, Sir
George Cribbett, Deputy Secretary of the Air Ministry of the United King-
dom, speaking on February 22, 1955, before the Italian Society for the
International Organization of the Center of the Development of Air Trans-
portation, in an address entitled "European Air Transportation; its Prob-
lems and Perspectives," termed this type of traffic "economically of greater
importance" than the type to which the Civil Aeronautics Board limited its
consideration. Furthermore, the Board's failure to consider such traffic in
its appraisal was in the face of an official United States Government policy
that such traffic is third-country or "fifth freedom" traffic under the Ber-
muda capacity provisions which were incorporated in the United States-
Germany Air Transport Agreement. It is our feeling that no United States
agency should engage in commercial bargaining of such far-reaching impor-
tance with so little appreciation or regard for the United States interests
being bargained away, with such inadequate preparation of data, and with
so little, and then faulty, communication and discussion with the United
States carriers it is intended to represent in the public interest of our
country.
The second line of argument used by the CAB to defend the grant of
routes to Germany brought into the controversy the interpretation and
application of the Bermuda principles. The CAB contended that the United
States carriers would not be seriously affected by the grants to Germany
because the capacity provisions in the agreement, being the Bermuda prin-
ciples, would prevent the German airline from operating enough capacity
between the United States and points in South America to damage American
carriers. The Board emphasized that it was these same capacity provisions
which the United States used to quiet the fears of foreign governments who
were concerned that United States long-haul operators would impair the
operation of local and regional carriers. If our carriers, said the Board,
lack confidence in the ability of these provisions to accomplish that, then
we must renegotiate our agreements and insert new provisions.
In support of the Board's view that the Bermuda principles would
restrain the number of schedules operated by the Germnas between New
York and South America, Mr. Joseph FitzGerald, Director, Bureau of Air
Operations, Civil Aeronautics Board, testified that, at the present time, on
the basis of United States statistics, the Germans could operate a maximum
of one flight a week. The grant of rights to the Germans to operate from
Germany to South America, he contended, is to permit the serving of traffic
going from Germany to South America. The Germans, under the Bermuda
principles, will be authorized to fly only such schedules as are required to
serve that traffic; and, since the more direct route between Germany and
South America-across the South Atlantic-will carry most of the traffic
from Germany to South America, very little would flow through New York.
Necessarily, the schedules on that route would be so limited as to impose no
serious threat to the United States carriers operating in that area.
It was this interpretation of Bermuda and application of Bermuda which
stirred sharp objections from the carriers. Their objections were the fol-
lowing: First, there is no basis in the Bermuda language to conclude that
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the Germans would be limited to any precise number of schedules. Second,
since a more direct route existed across the Atlantic, it becomes difficult to
apply the Bermuda principles when the route is so indirect. Thus, a route
from New York to London to Frankfurt to Vienna is justified by the number
of persons carried from New York to London to Frankfurt to Vienna, since
that is the most direct route between those two terminal points. The flow
of traffic between New York and London to Frankfurt and Vienna is suffi-
cient of itself to justify the operation. Therefore, the passengers taken on
at London and Frankfurt will be merely fill-up traffic to sustain a basically
sound route. On such a route, the provisions of the Bermuda capacity article
will serve as an effective guide for the amount of service offered. On the
South American route granted the Germans, it is more difficult to police
against these established yardsticks.
It seems to us that the German/Caribbean/South American route cannot
be justified as one which "shall retain as its primary objective the provision
of capacity adequate to the traffic demands between the country of which
such airline is a national and the country of ultimate destination of the
traffic." Such a route would have no justification under Bermuda concep-
tions. The main traffic flow between the termini of such a route would go
over the South Atlantic. Therefore, the traffic between the termnii moving
through New York would not justify a through operation. Once such a
route Were operated at any level of service, it perforce would have to rely
almost exclusively on the United States-South American traffic market, and
the language of the capacity provision could not operate effectively. A
serious disadvantage of such a route would be that the policing of the
capacity provisions would require the United States to constantly check the
number of passengers taken on by Lufthansa at New York for South
America, establishing a constant source of irritation between two govern-
ments where friendly relations should prevail. In addition, it would ulti-
mately reduce the level of frequencies to so low a number as to produce
complaints of unfairness. Diplomatically, this would be difficult; practically,
it has never been done before.
Our Government appears to have concluded that, once a route has been
granted which is economically sustainable by the traffic moving between its
termini because that it is most direct routing between those points, then
the carriers should be left considerable freedom to operate the amount of
capacity over that route to provide adequate service to the public. This is
substantially the interpretation given by the CAB spokesman in his further
testimony. Thus, Mr. FitzGerald testified:
I think, sir, we have to go back to one of the things we are trying to
do with Bermuda. It is basically an American concept, which we have
sought to sell the world. This concept is that once having negotiated the
routes, once having set up a rational route structure, then the determina-
tion of capacity over that route structure shall be left to the carriers.
The carriers contend that, under this interpretation, there is no basis
for believing that Lufthansa would be held to one schedule a week. In
fact, under the interpretation just given, Lufthansa would retain its dis-
cretion to put on as many schedules as it felt were required. In that way,
it could participate to a large extent in the rich flow of traffic between
New York and South America, to which the Germans have no claim and
on which our United States-flag carriers rely to support their operations.
The important consideration is to develop, from the outset, a rational
route structure. In the absence of one, any operation is at once an abuse
and the Bermuda formula just isn't applicable for determining just how
violent an abuse must be before corrective action should be taken. The
carriers made an additional significant charge. They pointed out that history
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indicated there was little basis for relying on our Government to enforce
the Bermuda principles. Thus, one spokesman testified that:
* * * never since the signing of the original Bermuda agreement in
1946 has the United States moved in a single instance to protect the
United States from diversions of the character which we are now talking
about. In fact, there has been no successful effort to secure from foreign
air carriers statistics which would show the true origin and destination
of traffic on their (foreign airlines) routes to and from the United
States. As a matter of fact, I urged both to the appropriate representa-
tives of the CAB and the Department of State in the latter part of
April of this year that this be done. * * * I checked this morning and
found that no such request has been made. * * * They permit the use
of these principles to curtail United States services but they have never
moved against a foreign country.
The carriers went on to make clear that they originally supported and
continued to support the Bermuda principles. As Mr. Tipton testified, the
airlines support the Bermuda-type agreements-
* * * not because they regard them as perfect documents, but because
they provide a practical adjustment of the varied interests of all the
governments and carriers whose interests must be taken into account in
negotiating such agreements.
The controversy around the Bermuda principles is so important to the
existing agreements containing those principles and to the agreements re-
maining to be negotiated that the committee, later in this report, will suggest
some general principles which it believes should guide our Government in
the interpretation and application of the Bermuda principles.
V. THE VALUE OF THE UNITED STATES MARKET AS AN EFFECTIVE
BARGAINING TOOL
By access to New York and Los Angeles, one foreign airline, the Scandi-
navian Airline System, has access to more people in those cities alone,
totaling 18,747,500, than the population of the 3 Scandinavian countries-
Norway, Sweden, and Denmark-which totals only 14,920,000.
In the German agreement that country was given rights to serve five
United States cities-Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, and either
San Francisco or Los Angeles. In exchange, United States carriers were
authorized to serve five German cities-Frankfurt, Dusseldorf-Cologne-Bonn
area (served through a single airport), Hamburg, Stuttgart, and Munich.
The metropolitan area of New York alone has a population of 13 million-
almost 3 times the, combined population, 4,641,844, of all the German cities
which United States air carriers would be authorized to serve. The com-
bined population of the metropolitan areas of the 5 United States cities
which the German carrier is authorized to serve is approximately 29 million
-a ratio of about 6 to 1 in relation to the 5 German cities, discounting the
infinitely greater travel potential interest in the United States cities in
question.
Of the United States population, more travel internationally by air than
do the people in any other country. In fiscal year 1955 there were 1,503,107
of our citizens who traveled abroad (not including Canada and Mexico) by
air. The importance of this market can be measured by the share it is of
the total international air transport market. In 1954 there were a total of
8 billion revenue passenger-miles flown in international air transportation
and of that number 4 billion, or one-half of the world total, were between
points in the United States and foreign points.
The United States market is so great that foreign airlines need not
rely on their own citizens as travelers; more than half of the passengers
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carried by the foreign-flag lines into or out of the United States in 1954
were United States citizens.
The airlines derived several conclusions from these facts. First, they
contended that an equitable exchange does not require an exchange of an
American city for each foreign city granted to a United States airline. They
contend that a proper evaluation of the right to serve a leading United
States city and the United States market generally (access to which is
provided by service to 1 of the 5 leading cities) gives the foreign carrier
far more than the United States gains from access to any number of cities
in most foreign countries. Thus, rights to New York give a foreign carrier
access to the largest single market in world air transportation. In 1954
this market generated 9,244,157 domestic and international passengers.
No other city in the world matches the present and potential air trans-
port volume of New York. The largest traffic centers outside of the United
States are London, Paris, and Rome, which in 1954 generated 2,242,598,
1,638,469, and 913,074 international and domestic air passengers respec-
tively.
Comparable markets in the United States are Miami, the 6th ranking
United States city with 2,536,599 international and domestic passengers in
1954; Atlanta, 8th ranking with 1,707,936; and Kansas City, 15th ranking
with 923,080 passengers. No airline would consider trading New York for
1 of these 3 cities. Yet such is the disparity of economic benefits between
United States and foreign cities that granting Chicago, Los Angeles, or
Washington to a foreign airline to obtain rights at a foreign city would be
the equivalent of trading one of our smaller cities for New York.
The Civil Aeronautics Board, on the other hand, argued that such valua-
tion was not persuasive with foreign governments because the value of
the United States market cannot be measured in a vacuum; it is valuable
only as Americans travel to foreign countries. The Board said in effect that
the foreign cities are an inseparable ingredient of the very value we claim;
unless an American has some place to go, there is no market to serve. Since
foreigners control the foreign city, they have equal claim to the value of
the United States market.
This argument overlooks, we believe, the value of the analysis in bar-
gaining for second and third cities in the foreign country. Once the foreign
airline operates to one United States city, such as New York, a flow is
established. It is that flow out from New York alone which is so great a
value that the foreign state should offer United States carriers access to a
second city in its homeland to attempt, even in limited measure, to match
the American grant.
We are disappointed that, at least in the presentation thus far made
and from the fact that many of the route exchanges gave an additional
United States city for rights to each foreign city granted to the United States,
there was no indication that the CAB prepared such evaluations, or used
them as bargaining weights in seeking United States air transport rights.
The airlines contended further that there was inadequate valuation of
the "beyond rights" obtained by a European carrier, in both directions,
when it is given access to the United States market. This, too, is part of
the highly prized United States market. European carriers by virtue of
their geographic location gain the opportunity to carry American travelers
not only to their home country in Europe but to and from many countries
both intermediate to and beyond their home country.
The exchange made between the United States and Germany illustrates
the problem. The United States carriers were given rights to operate
"beyond" Germany to points in the Near and Far East. The question in
issue in this negotiation, as in several others, was whether the grant of
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"beyond" rights to the German carrier to serve South America was neces-
sary or equitable. To evaluate the arguments, pro and con, of this contro-
versy it is necessary first to review certain aspects of international air
transport routes and the geographic and economic position of the United
States in relation to other countries.
The primary justification for the operation of an airline between Ger-
many and the United States is to serve the Germans who wish to come to
the United States and the Americans who wish to go to Germany. This is
the traffic to which both our own and the German carriers can lay some
prior claim. Fortunately for the German carrier, however, by extending its
operations-and it needs no approval from the United States to do so--
beyond Germany to Scandinavia, Switzerland, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Pakis-
tan, India, and Siam, and elsewhere, it can also offer, and will if it follows
the merchandising practices and enterprise of other European carriers, to
the American public a service to the latter places. In spite of the fact that
the traffic between the United States and Austria is traffic to which Austrian
and American operators should have the first claim, the geography of Europe
permits the German airline to offer substantially as good service as either
of the operators of the two countries primarily concerned. The net result
is that the already great value to the German airline of serving the New
York area is enhanced enormously by its ability to carry United States
travelers to countries beyond Germany.
This benefit of operating to the United States consists of access to two
flows of traffic. It consists of the traffic between the United States and
points intermediate to Germany and also the traffic between the United
States and points beyond Germany. Nor is it limited to German airlines.
This valuable privilege of carrying traffic to other than their home country
applies to all of the major European airlines.
The airlines contend that this result to foreign carriers is an economic
gain derived from operating to the United States which should be used in
the negotiations as any other bargaining value to protect or advance United
States air transport interests.
Due to lack of complete traffic data, inasmuch as foreign carriers do not
report the true origin and destination of traffic carried on their services in
and out of the United States, there is no exact means of measuring "beyond
rights" granted to the United States carriers. Conversely, it is not com-
pletely feasible to evaluate rights obtained by a foreign carrier for partici-
pation in traffic moving between the United States and points beyond the
homeland of the carrier. These rights are commonly referred to as "fifth
freedom privileges." These is no doubt the revenue derived from a passenger
traveling between the United States and India is greater than that obtained
from a passenger traveling between Holland and India. However, there was
agreement among the carriers that these "fifth freedom privileges" represent
a very important right and one that the United States should continue to
obtain for its airlines.
Based on the United States carriers' reports to the CAB for the months
of March and September 1954, the following estimates were introduced at
the hearings to demonstrate the value to foreign-flag airlines of carrying
traffic to other than their home countries (normally referred to as third-
country traffic) is enormously greater than the rights which American-flag
carriers obtain when they receive permission to land in a city of one of those
European countries. The number of travelers from a country such as
Holland, Denmark, or Israel to points farther east is far smaller than the
number in the United States to these points. Thus, the number of travelers
between Germany and India in 1954 was 826 but the number between the
United States and India was 9,680. Furthermore, the greater value to the
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foreign carrier from serving the United States is indicated by the value
of the revenue to the airline. When the American-flag airline picks up a
passenger in Paris going to Rome, the revenue earned is far smaller than
when the Italian airline picks up a passenger in New York destined to Paris,
or the French line a New York-Rome passenger. The fare the American-flag
carrier will earn from the transportation from Paris to Rome equals $53.20,
whereas the fare the Italian carrier will earn per passenger equals $310. In
order for the American carrier to earn as much from the Paris-Rome market
as the Italian earns from the New York-Paris market, he must carry more
than five times the number of passengers as does the Italian airline. Due
to the geographic location of the United States, this country does not have
parallel or compensatory opportunities.
This disparity between the United States and German airline operators
by virtue of their respective geographic location was illustrated as follows:
By being able to operate between Germany and India, the United States
carriers may compete for only 826 German tourists to India; but the German
carrier's access to the United States permits it to compete for 9,680 United
States-India travelers. Putting this in dollars, the German carrier is given
a right to compete in the United States-India market of some $13,500,000,
whereas the United States carrier receives only a right to compete in the
Germany-India market valued at $694,000. On this basis, one is worth about
19 times the other. In a similar vein, Germany-Beirut traffic carried by
United States airlines earned $78,600 a year; but United States-Beirut
traffic carried by the United States carriers alone earned $1,300,000 a year,
while the amount of traffic carried only by United States carriers between
the United States and selected third countries-which would be third-
country traffic for Germany, and for which the German airline could com-
pete-was nearly $82 million a year. This $82 million carriage, of course,
represented only a part of the market between such points available to the
Germans. It can be seen how important geography was to the creation of
this marked disparity.
The above gives some further indication of the potential traffic values
available to the German airline under the new agreement, but estimates
were also submitted of the advantages already being enjoyed by European
airlines which are operating between the United States and points inter-
mediate to and beyond their homeland. These estimates show those airlines
gain $33 million from this third-country traffic to and from the United States
contrasted with $12,916,000 earned by the United States carriers from
traffic carried between those foreign countries and third countries.
Comparison of estimated third-country passenger traffic carried by selected




Secured by for- carriers from
eign carriers homeland of
from the foreign carrier
Carrier United States indicated




Air France 1 4,826,000 3,911,000
Swissair 2,526,000 753,000
1 Includes New York-Mexico City 1954 figures.
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A further indication of the value placed by a foreign airline on the air
travel market between the United States and third countries is the adver-
tising they. support in such countries. The attached examples of ads placed
in United States newspapers by foreign carriers illustrate the efforts they
make to carry this fifth freedom traffic. (See appendix.)
It is illustrated further by the extracts from pamphlets used by KLM
(the Dutch airline) to persuade residents of Houston and Los Angeles of
their geographic proximity-not to Amsterdam, but to all the European
metropolitan areas KLM serves.
It seems clear to us from the testimony presented that our generosity
has curtailed United States participation in major markets of international
travel. In the transatlantic travel market, for example, which represents
more than 55 percent of all international travel to and from the United
States (excluding transborder travel), United States-flag carriers hauled
only 51 percent of this traffic in 1954 as compared with 83 percent in 1946.
The fact that more than 70 percent of all travelers to and from the United
States are United States residents emphasizes the significance of this
situation. Furthermore, this deals with the past, and does not reflect the
impact of partially implemented or unimplemented route grants, such as
those to Germany.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. General observations
There is no desire on our part to see the United States unfairly or
artificially restrict the growth of our foreign-flag competitors, large or
small, providing they are engaged in traffic recognized as primary under
the worldwide system of agreements into which the United States has
freely and generously entered. They are to be respected and allowed to
share in a prosperous international airline industry. Under the system of
regulated competition recognized for over a decade in these many agree-
ments, they can prosper in relation to the volume of traffic between their
country and ours. Indeed, many of them are extremely formidable competi-
tors, not only because of their inherent ability but because of their low
wage rates and the support accorded them by their respective governments.
However, no foreign-flag airline competitor to the United States-flag
carriers should be allowed to prosper at the expense of the United States
by engaging traffic to which it does not have a primary entitlement. The
United States has a legal and moral right to regulate competition of this
variety, and such action cannot be considered as contrary to the general
principle of liberality in international trade to which the United States
properly adheres. The United States, as the leader of the free world, has
a duty both to itself and to others to maintain a strong international air
transport system, and at reasonable cost to the taxpayers. Under the Ameri-
can system, this should be accomplished by private enterprise companies
which pay salaries and wages commensurate with the American standard
of living.
It would be no contribution to the welfare of the free world, and certainly
not to the welfare of the people of the United States, if America's inter-
national air transport system were to follow the deplorable downward path
of the United States-flag maritime industry. A sound basis for avoiding
such a catastrophe has existed since 1938 in the Civil Aeronautics Act, and
since 1946 in the so-called Bermuda-type bilateral air transport agreements.
It is only necessary to apply these two resources in accordance with their
basic principles and in the light of the economic realities which will con-
front us over the next decade. Nothing fundamental needs to be changed,
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but the policy direction, and the day-to-day decisions of those responsible
for handling these matters in our Government, need to be sharply reoriented.
If they are not, United States-flag carriers' now declining participation in
the world air market will continue. We have tended to bargain away too
frivolously the value of the United States market; this poor bargaining has
resulted in the loss of American dollars to American-flag carriers. This
criticism is not chauvinistic; it is based upon just plain good business sense.
B. Specific recommendations
1. The committee has not found any occasion to criticize the Bermuda
principles. The United States is committed to the Bermuda principles; the
airlines endorse them; and no feasible substitute has been suggested either
in the committee or subcommittee hearings.
2. Having committed itself to the Bermuda principles, the United States
should see to it that they are enforced with respect to the operations of
foreign carriers, consonant with the discussions in the body of the report.
3. The United States should not make route grants which cannot eco,
nomically be operated without violating Bermuda capacity principles.
4. The record before the committee pointed up the inadequacy of prepa-
ration for the German negotiations, and the great necessity for careful,
thorough preparation and use of economic data in the future.
5. Under the Civil Aeronautics Act, the CAB is the agency of Govern-
ment vested with the responsibility to develop an air transportation system
properly adapted to the present and future need of the foreign commerce of
the United States. This requires the Board to assert fully its responsibility
as the principal aviation adviser to the executive branch of the Government
on international air agreements.
6. Many of the inadequacies of the German agreement, we believe, result
from the failure of the Government to confer with and to allow sufficient
participation by representatives of the airline industry. It is important
that our Government avail itself of the expert assistance within the air
transport industry. The committee recommends the following principles
for Government consultation with United States air carriers in connection
with air transport negotiations:
(a) Interested carriers should be advised by the Government prior
to any discussions with respect to negotiations for air transport agree-
ments.
(b) Full and complete opportunity for discussion between interested
carriers, on the one hand, and the Government, on the other, should
precede any formal negotiations respecting air transport agreements.
(c) Prior to any discussions with foreign countries respecting air
transport agreements, representatives of all interested carriers should
consult fully with United States Government representatives.
(d) Prior to the formal negotiations on air transport agreements,
a representative of interested carriers should be made a duly accredited
member of any delegation appointed to negotiat4 such agreements.
As a duly credited official representative of the delegation, a carrier
representative should be included not only in all negotiating sessions
but also in all United States delegation meetings, and be given a fair
and reasonable opportunity to consult with his principals before any
ultimate decision is made.
(e) Also, throughout the negotiations, the interested carrier repre-
sentative should be consulted. We cannot emphasize too strongly our
view of the necessity of our Government's securing the benefit of the
comment of such representatives at every stage of the negotiation.
